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ABSTRACT 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior and 
this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final 
period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior is an 
extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but 
icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has recently 
noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" 
is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes, 
and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat 
muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations 
that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W's work and all 
useful discussion of behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas.  
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein's death and 
has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference 
to it in all of Searle and one see's whole books on W with barely a mention. There 
are however excellent books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts 
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of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume "Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty" 
is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for 
understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my 
view) like all analysis of W, they fall far short of grasping his unique and 
revolutionary advance in describing behavior. This exceptional work suffers from 
the same tunnel vision nearly all philosophy does by failing to put behavior in its 
broad contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt here. However, DMS is 
one of the top Wittgensteinians (and thus philosophers and descriptive 
psychologists) in the world and has written much new and ground breaking 
material since this volume appeared. 
 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior of 
all time and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third 
and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all 
behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious 
ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but the foundation for all 
description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must 
work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and 
common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily 
has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved 
psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended into a 
personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and 
arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of behavior is a development of 
or variation on these ideas. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now 
known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive 
linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, 
almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of 
descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is 
almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and 
humanities, and even those few in philosophy who have more or less understood 
him have not carried the analysis to its logical (psychological) conclusion nor 
realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions 
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(the two selves of fast and slow thinking--see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, 
refers to him periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension 
of W's, but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W 
analysts such as Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop 
short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. 
I eventually came to understand much of W by regarding his corpus as the 
pioneering effort in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the 
multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd 
period works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely 
revealing to alternate W with the writings of hundreds of other philosophers and 
evolutionary psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all behavioral 
scientists, cognitive linguists and others). 
 
 
W can e.g., be regarded as the pioneer of evolutionary cognitive linguistics--the Top 
Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of 
language use in context, to expose the many varieties of language games and the 
relationships between the primary games of the true-only axiomatic fast thinking 
of perception and memory and reflexive emotions and acts often described as the 
mostly subcortical reptilian brain first-self functions, and the later evolved higher 
cortical dispositional abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the 
true or false propositional secondary language games of slow thinking and the 
network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature 
that has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find this 
one not only lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen 
butter of discussions of higher order behavior. 
 
 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W's significance is 
partly due to the limited attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3rd period 
works have received, but even more to the inability to understand how profoundly 
our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, 
ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), 
alters once we accept this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the blank 
slate view of behavior still rests heavily on most people, pro or amateur and is the 
default of the second self of slow thinking conscious system 2, which is oblivious to 
the fact that the groundwork for all decisions lies in the unconscious, fast thinking 
axiomatic structure of system 1. Steven Pinker's brilliant `The Blank Slate: the 
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modern denial of human nature' is highly recommended preparation, even though 
it is now dated and he has no clue about Wittgenstein and hence of what can be 
regarded as the first really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. 
He seems not to grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive illusions 
that constitute our mental life. 
To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to imply that it is a direct result of 
W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing 
behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said. I find most of 
Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room 
argument against Strong AI. Incidentally if the Chinese Room interests you then 
you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually unknown, supplement on 
the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb 
papers on W's philosophy of mathematics (i.e., the EP of the axiomatic system 1 
Primary Language Games (PLG's) of counting as extended into the endless 
Language Games of math). 
 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some 
sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other 
"Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried 
to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of 
language in action, that language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the 
mind and human nature, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development 
of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, 
psychology and computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of 
Language Games (LG's) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is 
always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in 
these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
 
And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we can interact) is 
not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved 
Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the dispositions --
imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W's favorite 
topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but interdigitating) 
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LG's of fast and slow thinking-the epiphenomenality of our second-self mental life 
and the impossibility of private language. The PLG's are utterances of and 
descriptions of our involuntary, system 1, fast thinking, true only, untestable mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily 
later SLG's are descriptions of voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true or 
false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our 
whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize 
them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., 
"The greatest danger here is wanting observe oneself" LWPP1, 459). 
 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make this clear. After all, what exactly 
is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of describing 
behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably false or 
incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding 
"language philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since 
language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says (as he does many 
times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of 
psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another 
comment that I have never seen quoted "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? 
Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosopher’s task. Imagining 
possibilities." (LWPP1, 807).  
 
So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, 
PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is 
provide the physical basis for our behavior, facilitate our analysis of language 
games, and extend our EP, which remains unchanged (unless genetic engineering 
is unleashed to change our EP--but then it won't be us anymore). The true-only 
axioms of `'On Certainty'' are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background", 
which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the 
automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the 
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mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a 
popular intro to IF or Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution" for a pro 
intro. 
 
 
Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical  (nontestable) responses to the 
world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further 
true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but of course like 
many words, this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two 
hands or our breathing. This totally changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of 
Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of 
Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies 
and worms if UA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in 
higher eukaryotes). Likewise, the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any 
normal, rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for 
Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and 
all that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable workings of 
EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying 
that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human 
life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others). And incidentally, the 
equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and 
human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of 
our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by 
Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of 
other nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary 
fast thinking axioms and not testable propositional attitudes. 
 
 
It became clear to me recently that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast 
thinking or System One that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman-
-"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework over 50 
years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the 
mental states of perception and memory, as W notes over and over in endless 
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examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our 
cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or 
less "conscious" (beware another network of language games!) second-self  brain 
activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", 
which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, and do not have 
any definite time of occurrence. But disposition words like "knowing", 
"understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed extensively, have at 
least two basic uses (or, one might say, one major use and one abuse) or language 
games--a peculiar philosophical use by exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC) which refers to the true-only sentences based on direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic psychology (`I know these are 
my hands'), and their normal use as dispositions, which are acted out and which 
can become true or false (`I know my way home'). 
 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
"cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these 
too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System One to 
combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, since any thought or intentional 
action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of the 
"cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms" or "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act. It 
is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious 
automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later 
evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting 
etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest 
experimental psychology, which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book 
cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of 
recent work he does not cite). It is an easily defensible view that most of the 
burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is wholly compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. 
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Probably the leading current exponent of W's ideas on the language games of inner 
and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) 
is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University as DMS. His 
approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in numerous recent 
books and papers. See my review of his ‘Radicalizing Enactivism’ (2012). He is also 
author of the best deconstruction I know of Dennett's preposterous claim to be 
following in W's footsteps (in fact he is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in 
grandiose fashion). But of course one must read Searle too and the title of his famous 
review of Dennett's book says it well "Consciousness Explained Away". 
Incidentally, unlike some philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no 
effort to give the general public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every 
paper free online (though of course usually just proofs and not the final journal 
version, but see b-ok.org for these). 
 
 
Here, as throughout W's works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative 
and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and 
handwritten German notes, with "Satz" being frequently incorrectly rendered as 
"proposition"(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our 
nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct "sentence", which 
CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as "these are my hands" 
or "Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million 
years ago"(and since this is an unavoidable extension of our psychology, what does 
this imply about creationists?). 
 
Incidentally, regarding the view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody 
has noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times 
in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test--
long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
 
The view that even the brightest philosophers do not really grasp the context in 
which they are operating is perhaps most strikingly illustrated when they attempt 
to define philosophy. In recent years I have seen such definitions by two of those I 
hold in highest regard--Graham Priest and John Searle, and of course they mention 
truth, language, reality etc., but not a word to suggest it is a description of our innate 
universal axiomatic psychology and its extensions. Priest, by the way, has noted 
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that W was the first to predict the emergence of paraconsistent logic. 
 
Let me note that even now new W writings continue to be published.  Yorick 
Smithies notes on W’s lectures has appeared and a version of the brown book which 
he dictated to Francis Skinner will be published by Springer in 2019. A new version 
of the Bergen CD will appear ca 2021 and see Pichler for the latest on the nachlass 
online http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf. 
 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically 
and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.  
 
 The table of intentionality which I generated follows here. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of 
personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here 
and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table 
by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come principally from decision 
research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings.  
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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